I wrote this in 2006 for my doctoral students at Syracuse University and just found it while unpacking after my move to Round Rock. I had not remembered having this basic thought so long ago.
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What is it that makes possible the progressive development
of knowledge and understanding? This is a complex question since it presumes
that there indeed exists something legitimately called the progressive
development of knowledge. I admit to starting out with such an assumption. I
want to explore some principles or basic ideas that seem relevant to an account
of the progressive development of knowledge. Without these ideas, it is not
clear, at least to me, how to account for human knowledge and understanding.
These seven basic ideas are:
1. Humans
are not born knowing everything that there is to know. As obvious as this might
seem, there have been people who rejected this most basic idea (see Plato’s
discussion of anamnesis in The Meno and
The Phaedo, for example).
2. Knowledge
refers to widely held and exceptionally well-established beliefs to which
people are generally warranted in attaching their very highest levels of
confidence. Statements that are likely candidates in this category include:
‘there is a constant ratio between the circumference and the diameter of a
circle’ and ‘the speed of sound varies depending on the medium through which it
is traveling’.
3. We
hold many other beliefs that can also be formulated as statements. We might generally
attach less confidence to these other beliefs, but these beliefs nevertheless
help us build up our knowledge of our surroundings and experiences. Statements
that are likely candidates in this category include: ‘experienced statisticians
provide reliable statistical analyses’ and ‘historical documents reliably
represent facts and events’. For a very nice discussion of how these beliefs
are intertwined see The Web of Belief by
Quine and Ullian.
4. Asking
a question involves formulating a particular grammatical structure that
typically ends with a question mark if it happens to be formulated on paper or
with a rising tone of voice when formulated orally in English. Questions might
begin with a word that implies that a question follows (e.g., ‘how’, ‘what’,
‘who’, ‘when’, ‘where’, ‘why’, ‘whether’), or one can transform a declarative
statement into a question without using a question word. A particular rule in
English guides the transformation of a statement into a question: put the verb
first and place a question mark at the end. For example, one can transform the
statement ‘There is a constant ratio between the circumference and the diameter
of a circle.’ into this question: ‘Is there a constant ratio between the
circumference and the diameter of a circle?’ Moreover, one may ask that
question without knowing the answer, although there is some evidence that this
piece of knowledge dates back to biblical times (Kings I, 7, 23) and ancient Egypt (the Rhind Papyrus dated about 1650 BCE). What is old knowledge for some
may become new knowledge for others. One can formulate a question without being
concerned with the answer, however. For example, someone might reply in the
course of a conversation, “Is that any business of yours?” The elements of a
question are in place – verb comes first, question mark comes last. But there
is no search for an answer in this case. Rather, this apparent question may be
used to terminate any further inquiry. Beware rhetorical questions – they do
not contribute to the progressive development of knowledge.
5. Having
a question involves a search for an answer. The person who asks about the ratio
between the circumference and diameter might ask without knowing that there is in
fact a constant ration. This person might then engage in some physical
experiments and measurements and discover, much like the ancient Egyptians,
that there did seem to be a constant ratio regardless of how large or how small
the circle was. Such a person might then go on to prove, in the spirit of
Archimedes, that the results obtained empirically were mathematically correct.
Having arrived at the knowledge that the ratio between the circumference and
diameter of a circle is constant, our budding mathematician might go on to
wonder whether or not the sequence of numbers in the expansion of that constant
ever repeated. One should set aside a fair amount of time for such an
enterprise. In any case, having a question implies that one does not know the
answer and is willing to engage in a search for an answer or for possible
alternative answers. We ought to have
more questions.
6. The
logic of having questions can be generally represented as follows:
a. First,
one admits to not knowing or understanding X but wanting to know or understand
X, where X represents some apparently non-obvious state of affairs of
phenomenon. This simply means that one does not engage in a search for the
obvious or for what is already accepted as known. One starts from a position of
humility (‘I do not know’) and optimism (‘I can understand this if I
make an effort’).
b. Next,
one begins to generate explanations and gathers evidence. This may be difficult
in those cases where one has very little idea as to the nature of what one is
seeking. A search, after all, is a search for what one does not have – in this
case we are talking about looking for knowledge and understanding. There is a
paradox of sorts connected with the fact that one is searching for an unknown X
– if the item being sought is totally unknown in every respect, it is difficult
to imagine how the search could be successfully resolved. The way around this
apparent paradox is to simply acknowledge the situation that gave rise to the
search, which presumably involved some things that one accepted, other things
that required explanation, and some notion of what an adequate explanation
would be like. For example, suppose that I am seeking to understand why sound
seems to travel faster in water than in air. I might gather some evidence first
to confirm my point of departure – that sound does indeed travel faster in
water than in air. I might gather additional data points, at differing depths
and altitudes and formulate an initial hypothesis that density appears to play
a role (water being more dense than air, air being less dense at higher
altitudes, and salt water being more dense than fresh water). I might even be
sufficiently clever to test this initial hypothesis that the density of the
medium is relevant to the speed of sound by checking to see if sounds travels even
faster through a solid object such as a piece of metal or how fast sound
travels in a vacuum (not very fast). While these further tests and observations
may confirm the initial hypothesis, one ought not abandon one’s initial
humility too readily – the hypothesis that the speed of sound through a medium
is directly and closely correlated with the density of that medium could still
be mistaken. Indeed, one might happen to observe that sound does not seem to
travel very fast through hydrogen in comparison with nitrogen, even though
nitrogen is more dense than hydrogen. Factors other than density must be added
to the hypothesis to account for such additional observations – for example,
the elasticity of the medium may well be relevant to the propagation of sound
waves through that medium.
c. Having
a question, then, is often a process of iterative refinement and often involves
a search for a satisfactory answer – one that may serve a short-term purpose
(explain a difference between the observed speed of sound in air and water) –
but the process may continue. This is how a body of knowledge is built up.
Maintaining a sense of humility (‘I do not fully understand this phenomenon
yet’) is just as important as maintaining a sense of optimism (‘I can
understand this phenomenon better if I continue my investigations’).
7. Not
all beliefs are like this. Some beliefs are withheld from the scrutiny of such
investigative cycles for various reasons. It is perhaps worthwhile to
distinguish those beliefs that we are willing to subject to further
investigation – and by implication willing to admit may be false or misleading
or in need for refinement – from those that we wish to exclude, for whatever
reasons, from such inquiry and refinement. What beliefs do we withhold from
scrutiny and why? This may be a question worth investigating. It is likely that
different people will admit to withholding different beliefs and for different
reasons. Consider the statement ‘there is intelligent life outside our solar
system’ as a candidate. One person may decide to withhold it from scrutiny
because it is simply too difficult to investigate. Another may decide to
withhold it because it conflicts with other beliefs that person has accepted,
some of which might also be withheld from the process of iterative scrutiny.
Still others may decide that it is worth investigating and not withhold it from
scrutiny (see Carl Sagan’s Cosmos,
for example).
As an additional
example, imagine that you are backpacking with a friend in the Rocky Mountains
and happen across a rock which appears to contain a fossil of a creature you do
not recognize (see Gould’s Wonderful Life).
You happen to be very knowledgeable about geology, paleontology, and zoology.
Neither you nor your friend can explain the fossil. You speculate that the
fossil may represent a species that no longer exists, one that died out
millions of years ago. Your friend may object, perhaps on religious grounds. In
this case, one of you may decide to investigate further, and one may decide to
abandon any search for an explanation. At this point, the dialogue may end in
amicable disengagement – hopefully it does not degenerate into brow and breast
beating or worse. It is important in such cases to distinguish a search for an
explanation, which involves gathering additional evidence and a willingness to
abandon initial hypotheses explaining the phenomenon in question, from a search
for reasons to adopt one explanation or another. Gathering reasons,
constructing arguments, and developing positions of advocacy for one position
or another should not be confused with conducting searches and making
empirically grounded inquiries (see Sextus Empiricus’ Against the Logicians). Yes, I admit to having been trained as a
logician. People do engage in both kinds of enterprises – inquiry and
rationalization. This seventh idea is about why and how we ought to avoid
confusing these two different kinds of cognitive enterprise. And on this
seventh point, I shall rest … until I trip over a butterfly or find another
interesting question.
